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Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation
Holly Doremus  and A. Dan Tarlock* **
I.  INTRODUCTION
The modern environmental movement is the heir to the Enlightenment’s substitution of
science, broadly defined, for religion as the fundamental norm for organizing society.  There are,
of course, important ethical, religious and “spiritual” strands to modern environmentalism, but
environmentalism is primarily science-based.  Environmentalism would not exist were it not for
the writings of scientists such as Aldo Leopold,  Rachael Carson,  Rene Dubos  and Paul Sears,1 2 3 4
to name just a few.  Environmental law is even more indebted than the environmental movement
to science; science has been seen both as the justification for environmental law and as the means
for fairly administering it.
Initially, environmentalism was built on a simple but radical principle:  let nature be.  The
hope was that science could point the way to measures that would let nature co-exist with human
exploitation.  The modern recognition of the complexity of nature and the need for active
2
management has made science even more important.  Today, environmental law seeks to find the
perfect balance between preservation and exploitation.
Administration of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the Klamath Basin illustrates the
challenges of scientifically managing nature.  A series of science-based decisions are needed,
from species listing to consultation on federal actions.  Those decisions carry substantial costs for
the people who share the landscape with protected species.  Unless science can provide some
level of confidence that management actions are both necessary and effective, those decisions
will be widely perceived as unfair.  The key question, not yet answered, is just how much
confidence should be expected.
That science must play a role in natural resource management decisions goes almost
without saying.  It is obvious that we cannot protect endangered species unless we know
something about their needs, that we cannot rebuild depleted fisheries without some sense of
their population dynamics, and that we cannot sensibly decide whether and to what extent to log
in our national forests unless we know something about how that decision will impact the
physical and biotic environment.  Not surprisingly, the law has responded to the need for
scientific input.  A wealth of legislative and regulatory mandates require that environmental and
natural resource management agencies seek the advice of scientists, consider the best available
scientific information, or obtain outside scientific review of their decisions.
Natural resource regulation, it would be fair to say, is heavily “scientized,” by which we
mean both that the current regulatory structure requires the use of science in a wide range of
decisions, and that the decisionmakers emphasize the role of science in those decisions. 
Nonetheless, critics on all sides of the political spectrum claim to believe that regulatory
decisions remain insufficiently scientific.  Critics equate scientific decisionmaking with an
objective, rational, analytically rigorous approach, contrasting it with “political” decisionmaking,
Some legal academics, particularly proponents of quantifiable decisionmaking, have also5
urged the need to make regulatory decisions, particularly those in the environmental realm, more
scientific.  See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at EPA, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 45, 49 (2003) (“there is currently too much politics and not enough science in
our environmental decisions”).
Two reports issued within months of each other from very different political perspectives6
illustrate this point.  In July 2003, the conservative Hoover Institution published POLITICIZING
SCIENCE:  THE ALCHEMY OF POLICYMAKING (Michael Gough, ed., 2003), a collection of essays,
many about environmental regulation, complaining that politics was overriding science to
produce rampant unnecessary environmental regulation.  The next month, Representative Henry
Waxman, a liberal Democrat, released a report, asserting that the George W. Bush administration
had sacrificed scientific integrity at federal agencies in order to further its conservative agenda. 
U.S House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform – Minority Staff Special
Investigations Division, Politics and Science in the Bush Administration (Prepared for
Representative Henry Waxman) (available, as updated November 13, 2003, at
http://democrats.reform.house.gov/features/politics_and_science/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_
rep.pdf).  Early in 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists weighed in with its own report
charging that the Bush administration was manipulating, distorting, and suppressing science on
an unprecedented scale.  Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An
Investigation into the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science 2 (March 2004) (available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_environment/rsi/page.cfm?pageID=1322).
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which is assumed to be subjective, emotional, and responsive to special interests.   They agree5
that making decisions more scientific, and thus less political, will produce better regulatory
decisions.   However, at this point the consensus disappears.  Critics sharply disagree about6
whether regulators are plagued primarily by too little good information or too much bad
information.
There may well be points in the decisionmaking process at which greater objectivity
would be desirable.  As we argue in more detail below, however, science can never provide the
perfect rationality we have been conditioned to expect from it.  Therefore, simplistic generalized
demands for objective rationality are not a useful reform strategy.  Typically, the disputes are
fundamentally about how incomplete data are interpreted and applied, rather than about what the
data are or how they have been gathered.  Agency judgments, in other words, are the real issue. 
It is impossible to entirely prevent the exercise of judgment, influenced by the subjective values
and biases of the decisionmaker, from creeping into decisions.  A more useful inquiry would take
a closer look at the role of judgment, asking at what stage and through what mechanisms it
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(a), 1373(a).7
16 U.S.C. § 1361(2).8
16 U.S.C. § 1362(9).9
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factors into resource management decisions, whether the effect of those judgment steps is to
advance or retard the identification and achievement of societal goals, and, when correction is
needed, how judgments might be more closely constrained.
II.  WHAT SCIENCE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IS INTENDED TO ACHIEVE
As a preliminary step before considering whether the use of science in resource
management decisions requires reform, and if so in what guise, it is worth looking more closely
at what benefits science is supposed to bring.  Science mandates, in their various forms, are
expected to serve several distinct goals.
First, science is supposed to help society achieve exogenously-determined substantive
goals by ensuring that the most precise and accurate information available is factored into
decisions.  For example, before harvest of marine mammals may be authorized under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, also known as
NOAA Fisheries) must find, on the basis of the best scientific evidence available, that the
permitted harvest is consistent with “sound principles of resources protection and conservation”
and “will not be to the disadvantage” of the stock in question.   Science is invoked to help assure7
that the substantive conservation goals of the Act, primarily maintenance of stocks at the
optimum sustainable population level,  are met.8
Second, science is expected to clarify highly general goals in specific contexts, or to
strike a viable balance between conflicting goals.  Again the MMPA provides an example. 
Optimum sustainable population is defined as the population level that will provide the greatest
productivity for harvest, consistent with the health of the ecosystem.   That goal is a compromise9
between exploitation and protection; science is expected to identify the point at which society
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).10
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).11
520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997).  We do not endorse Justice Scalia’s exercise in stautory12
interpretation, which ignores both the ESA’s overriding conservation purpose and the specific
history of its science requirements.  See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the
Field: Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 Admin L.
Rev. 763, 784-86 (1997).  We simply use it as an example of one kind of expectation for science-
based decisionmaking.
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can have its cake while eating as much of it as possible.  Similarly, under the ESA, federal
agencies must ensure, using the best scientific data available, that their actions will not
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species.   But if, in the course of the consultation10
process through which this obligation is implemented, the regulatory agency determines that the
proposed action will cause jeopardy, it must recommend reasonable and prudent alternatives,11
that is modifications of the action that will allow it to proceed without jeopardizing the listed
species.  These statutory requirements assume that science can find a perfect balance point,
allowing extraction and development precisely up to the point at which they become inconsistent
with conservation.  In this paradigm, science justifies regulatory restrictions that impose
substantial economic impacts on individuals and communities dependent on resource
exploitation by showing those restrictions to be necessary and effective.
Third, science mandates might be intended to constrain the exercise of discretion by
agencies that are no longer automatically trusted to pursue the public interest.  As Justice Scalia
put it in Bennett v. Spear:
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency “use the best scientific
and commercial data available” is to ensure that the ESA not be implemented
haphazardly, on the basis of speculation or surmise.  While this no doubt serves to
advance the ESA’s overall goal of species preservation, we think it readily
apparent that another objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid needless
economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently
pursuing their environmental objectives.12
When the science mandates of the ESA and other conservation laws were first put in place in the
early 1970s, they might reasonably have been seen as needed to increase judicial oversight,
See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 53213
(1985).
Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s14
Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 423 (2004).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).15
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better16
Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1055 (1997); H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
97-835 at 20; H.R. REP. NO.97-567 at 20.
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because judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at that time was
extraordinarily deferential.   Today, however, ordinary APA review requires that agencies13
provide some scientific justification for highly technical decisions even in the absence of any
explicit legislative science mandate.  It is not clear that science mandates add any additional level
of constraint.14
Science mandates do help to limit the influence of forbidden considerations in regulatory
decisions, in a way that the APA’s limits on arbitrary and capricious decisions do not.  For
example, the ESA was amended in 1982, in response to the Reagan administration’s refusal to
add species to the protected list, to require that listing decisions rest solely on the best scientific
data available.   That change was intended to prevent the regulatory agencies from deciding not15
to list species based on concerns about the economic costs of conservation.   While no one16
believes the change has entirely kept costs out of the implicit regulatory analysis, it at least
forecloses open reliance on costs as a basis for refusing to list.
A science mandate need not be as explicit as the ESA’s listing provision to have this
effect; it may enough that the decision to be made is clearly a scientific one.  Under a statute
making continued imports of tuna dependent upon the Secretary of Commerce finding that the
common practice in eastern Pacific tuna fisheries of setting nets based on the presence of
dolphins was not having a significant adverse effect on dolphin populations, a federal court
recently held that the Secretary could not consider the impact of the decision on trade or
Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, 2004 WL 1774221, slip op. at 26-30 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 9,17
2004).
See CALFED Bay-Delta Program, Programmatic Record of Decision 74-76 (Aug. 28,18
2000), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneralArchive/rod/ROD8-28-00.pdf (last
visited Jan. 27, 2005).
For descriptions of the background to CALFED and the difficult and protracted19
negotiations that gave birth to the program, see Patrick Wright, Fixing the Delta: The CALFED
Bay-Delta Program and Water Policy Under the Davis Administration, 31 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 331 (2001); Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability,
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (1996); A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism Without Preemption: A Case Study
in Bioregionalism, 27 PAC. L. J. 1629, 1643-45 (1996).
See Katharine L. Jacobs, Samuel N. Luoma, and Kim A. Taylor, CALFED: An20
Experiment in Science and Decisionmaking, ENVIRONMENT, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 30, 36.
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international relations.   The court reversed the agency’s conclusion that there was no significant17
effect, because the evidence suggested that conclusion was based more on concerns about foreign
relations than on the available scientific evidence.
Finally, it is often hoped that requiring that agencies base their regulatory decisions on
science will tone down intense conflicts over the allocation of scarce natural resources.  For
example, the CALFED Bay-Delta Authority, created by agreement between California and the
federal government in the late 1990s, included from the outset a strong emphasis on credible
scientific analysis independent of regulatory decisionmaking, and ongoing oversight by
distinguished outside scientists.   CALFED was intended to resolve the bitter conflicts between18
the state and federal governments, between water users and environmental groups, and among
water users, that had for years paralyzed efforts to address the environmental problems plaguing
the San Francisco Bay-Delta.   A strong science program was seen as an essential element of the19
program from the outset, with the idea that more complete, transparent, and credible scientific
information would defuse some of the controversy.   Emphasis on science in decisionmaking,20
however, and even increased databases if decoupled from increased understanding, can
exacerbate controversy by making it easier for people on all sides of the dispute to selectively
Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 ENVTL.21
SCI. & POL’Y 385 (2004).
See id. at ___.22
For a detailed description of this conflict, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish,23
Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 (2003).
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reinforce their beliefs.   Furthermore, it is easy to oversell the value of science in calming21
controversy.  Most of the conflicts over natural resource management boil down to disagreements
about values and priorities.  Unless scientific information reveals that all competing goals can be
achieved, it will not solve the underlying conflict.22
Dan will add a paragraph on acceptable risk solutions?
III.  THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDGMENT IN REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING
Simple science mandates – directives that agencies use the best available scientific data,
consult with scientists in formulating decisions, and seek review of data by outside scientists –
could ensure accurate decisions, closely constrain agency discretion, and defuse controversy if: 
1) the available scientific data were reliably complete, precise, and relevant to the decision (or
could be made so within the time frame allowed for decisionmaking); and 2) agency
decisionmakers could be relied upon to strike the same balance between competing goals as the
larger society would.  Unfortunately, neither of these conditions is routinely satisfied.
The hard reality is that the scientific information available to support environmental and
natural resource policy decisions is frequently incomplete, ambiguous, and contested.  An array
of critical interpretive judgments, not fully determined by the data, are needed to translate that
kind of science into policy.  Furthermore, when societal goals must be balanced, there is no
reason a priori to believe that they will strike the same balance as the larger society.  The
Klamath Basin water conflict  illustrates the inevitable role of judgment in natural resource23
regulation.  
A.  The Klamath Basin Water Conflict
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).24
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The Klamath Basin, straddling the Oregon-California border, contains two distinctly
different parts.  The inland Upper Basin is high, flat, and arid, with a climate similar to the Great
Basin.  Near the coast, the Lower Basin is characterized by steep mountains and abundant
rainfall.  Until white settlement of the area in the late 19th century, the Upper Basin landscape
was a system of interconnected shallow wetlands – the Everglades of the west.  The vast majority
of those wetlands were drained early in the 20th century for conversion to agriculture.  The
federal Klamath Project, operated by the Bureau of Reclamation, irrigates the highest-value farm
land in the Upper Basin.  The major natural waterbody in the Upper Basin, Upper Klamath Lake,
serves as the primary storage reservoir for the Project.  Upper Klamath Lake is extensive but very
shallow, averaging only eight feet deep.  It cannot store enough water to carry over from year to
year.  As a result, Klamath Project water supplies are always at the mercy of the highly variable
annual precipitation.
Three species of fish in the Klamath Basin are protected by the ESA:  the Lost River and
shortnose suckers, which inhabit Upper Klamath Lake and other water bodies of the Upper
Basin; and the Southern Oregon / Northern California coastal coho salmon, which range up the
Klamath River and its tributaries as far as Iron Gate Dam, the unofficial dividing point between
the Upper and Lower Basins.  The ESA requires that all federal agencies ensure that their actions
do not jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.   With listed species both in the24
Upper and Lower Basins, the Bureau of Reclamation for the first time had to consider
subordinating irrigation deliveries to species conservation.  Its decisions were made through a
prescribed process of consultation with two wildlife agencies: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS), which is responsible for the endangered suckers; and NOAA Fisheries (also known as the
National Marine Fisheries Service), which oversees the threatened salmon.  The action agency
provides the wildlife agencies with a “biological assessment,” its written evaluation of the effects
16 U.S.C. § 1536(c).25
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. 402.02.26
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (explaining that a biological opinion27
“theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’” but actually has a powerful coercive effect because
it will influence reviewing courts).
10
of its action on listed species.   After reviewing that assessment, the wildlife agencies issue a25
“biological opinion” concluding that the action as proposed either will or will not violate the
prohibition on jeopardy.  If they find jeopardy, the wildlife agencies must suggest “reasonable
and prudent alternatives” consistent with the proposed action and within the action agency’s
authority, that will not cause jeopardy.   The action agency ultimately makes the decision26
whether or not to proceed with the action, and in what form, but if it proceeds in the face of a
jeopardy opinion it can expect at least a skeptical review from the courts.27
In 2001, a drought intensified competition for the Klamath Basin’s limited water
resources.  The Bureau prepared a biological assessment calling for maintaining distribution of
water to farmers, at the cost of reducing water levels in Upper Klamath Lake and flows in the
Klamath River below those at which the Project had traditionally been operated.  FWS found that
the Bureau’s proposal would jeopardize the listed suckers; in order to protect them, it called for
maintaining higher water levels in Upper Klamath Lake.  NOAA Fisheries concluded that the
coho would also be jeopardized by the Bureaus’s proposal; it prescribed higher seasonal flows in
the Klamath mainstem than the Bureau proposed.  Although it did not concede that the wildlife
agencies’ analyses were correct, the Bureau believed it was effectively bound by the two
biological opinions.  It therefore agreed to follow them.  Doing so left no water available from
Upper Klamath Lake for project irrigators.  For the first time, the headgates of a federal irrigation
project were closed in order to protect fish.
The resulting outcry focused on the extent of scientific support for the biological
opinions.  The Bush administration sought review of the science by the National Research
Council (NRC), the policy advice arm of the independent National Academies.  The NRC
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON28
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, SCIENTIFIC
EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN 2 (2002).
Id.29
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE30
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY (2004)
[hereinafter “FINAL NRC REPORT].
See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, House Panel Approves Species Act Changes, WASH. POST,31
July 22, 2004, at A19; Natalie M. Henry, Walden to Tout ESA Reform at Klamath Basin Field
Hearing, ENVT. & ENERGY DAILY, July 16, 2004.
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followed its usual procedure, appointing a committee of experts from a variety of disciplines to
spend several months reviewing the Klamath biological opinions.  The committee’s preliminary
report concluded, in terms far less nuanced than most NRC reports, that there was “no substantial
scientific support” for either FWS’ demands for higher lake levels or NOAA Fisheries’ demands
for higher river flows.   The committee also noted that there was no substantial scientific support28
for the Bureau of Reclamation’s proposal to reduce lake levels and instream flows.  29
Subsequently, in a much more detailed final report, the committee reiterated and expanded upon
its conclusions.   Because the Klamath conflict has been used by critics of the ESA to argue that30
regulatory decisions are not sufficiently scientific,  it makes a useful example of the inevitable31
role of non-scientific judgments in the regulatory process.
B.  A Taxonomy of Judgment in the Regulatory Process
The Klamath conflict illustrates the three types of judgment needed to translate scientific
data into regulatory decisions.  It also vividly demonstrates that natural resource conflicts are
typically fundamentally about the judgments applied to the existing scientific data, rather than
about the data themselves or the methods by which they are derived.
1.  Scientific judgments
The scientific process is an extraordinarily powerful method of generating strongly
reliable, objective information about the natural world over time.  Scientists gather data through
Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative32
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO.
L.J. 729, 748 (1979). 
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observations or experimental manipulations.  They then communicate their results, with an
explanation of the methods used to generate them, to the relevant scientific community.  That
allows other scientists to review and critique the work, and to repeat, refute, or extend the
observations.  As observations accumulate, this process builds a tentative consensus in the
scientific community.  Eventually, with enough research effort producing consistent results, this
tentative consensus can mature into strong confidence among scientists that they understand how
parts of the natural world work. 
Judgment is an inherent aspect of the scientific research process.  In the early stages or at
the frontiers of knowledge, science is a messy process characterized by competing explanations. 
Research scientists must constantly exercise judgment – in deciding what to test, what
explanations to accept, and which data to prefer when some are consistent with their preferred
explanation and others are not.
Scientific judgments are closely intertwined with judgments about the desirability of
avoiding different types of error, which are not “scientific” at all.  Research scientists in many
fields, by convention, do not claim that they have “proven” their point unless the data reaches a
specific level of statistical significance, providing 95% confidence that their observations are not
attributable to chance alone.  There is nothing magic about that confidence level.  It has become
customary because it serves the goals of research science.  It keeps scientists in the field from
prematurely accepting a hypothesis as proven and moving on, likely down an unproductive
research path.  But, as Professor McGarity so aptly put it twenty-five years ago, “statistical
significance is an issue of pure policy.”   Furthermore, scientific conventions about statistical32
significance have limited force; they foreclose only claims of proof on the basis of single studies. 
They do not prevent scientists from believing a connection is real on the basis of far less
conclusive evidence, or from acting on that belief in, for example, choosing their next research
See Doremus, supra note 16, at 1070-71, and sources cited therein.33
When Professor Tarlock taught at Indiana University, Bloomington, he was involved in34
coordinating the University response to a proposal by a public utility to run a power line through
a University-owned hardwood forest.  A young professor of biology offered to brief the Board of
Trustees on the adverse environmental impacts of power lines, but he had to be dissuaded from
talking about the interruption of mountain lin and grizzly bear migration patterns, since those
species were not known to exist in southern Indiana.
Gordon L. Baskerville, Advocacy, Science, Policy, and Life in the Real World, 135
CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 9 (1997), http://www.consecol.org/vol1/iss1/art9.
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project.  Nor do they prevent an accumulation of studies, each of which falls short of statistical
significance, from being taken as a whole to prove the connection.   Even without additional33
studies, a persuasive explanation of the relationship between an alleged cause and effect may
lead scientists to accept to its existence without strong data.
An additional scientific judgment step, beyond those inherent in the research process, is
often required when research science is applied to resource management.  Much of the ecological
research which forms the fundamental basis for resource management efforts is conducted by
academics, and funded by general research programs.  Not surprisingly, academic researchers
focus on locations and systems that are convenient to study and fit their research goals.  Those
are not necessarily the same systems that require management.   Management controversies may34
bring targeted research funding but quite often, especially early in the management cycle, agency
personnel must extrapolate results from small scale manipulation to large scale management, or
from one location, system, or species to a very different one..35
The Klamath biological opinions required numerous scientific judgments.  Those most
directly connected to the controversy were about the effect of water levels in Upper Klamath
Lake on the endangered suckers and of flows levels in the mainstem Klamath River on the
threatened coho salmon.  As is so often the case in natural resource management, those
judgments had to be made on the basis of very limited information.
Scientific interest in the suckers and salmon was not high until they were listed under the
Endangered Species Act.  The earliest data correlating environmental conditions with the status
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. and Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act36
Consultation Handbook: Procedures for Conducting Section 7 Consultations and Conferences 1-
6 (Mar. 1988).
NRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 23937
In its preliminary report, the NRC committee noted that there were no fish kills in low38
water years in the 1990s.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF
BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER
BASIN: INTERIM REPORT 17 (2002).
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of the suckers, therefore, dated only to 1990.  Even for that brief period, the available data were
spotty and had not been collected systematically.  When it produced its biological opinion in
2001, therefore, FWS knew it was working with limited data.  It had to make very specific
judgments on the basis of that very limited data, deciding whether the operation of the Klamath
Project as proposed by the Bureau of Reclamation would impermissibly affect the suckers, and
further deciding how proposed operations could be modified to lessen those impacts enough. 
Applying its established interpretation of the ESA that the benefit of the doubt in section 7
consultation must go to the listed species,  FWS called for lake levels to remain higher than the36
Bureau proposed, and even higher than they had been kept in recent dry years.
Reviewing that decision later, the NRC committee criticized the agency’s scientific
judgments, purporting to put to one side the agency’s policy decision to impose some unspecified
level of caution.  The committee felt that the available data contradicted FWS’ claim that low
water levels in Upper Klamath Lake might contribute to adult mass die-offs or impede juvenile
recruitment, and therefore that even a cautious interpretation of those data could not support
FWS’ call for higher water levels.  The committee’s view was surely tenable one, but not
incontestable.  It turns out that is not always easy to tell whether the available data confirm or
refute a particular hypothesis, and that this was situation was a difficult one to sort out.  The data,
limited as they were, showed that adult fish kills had occurred in years of high, low, and average
summer lake levels.   That data straightforwardly supports the NRC committee’s interpretation37






complicated with respect to the impacts of low spring lake levels on recruitment.  Because lake
levels are closely related to the availability of spawning habitat, the NRC committee agreed that
it was “a reasonable hypothesis” that lake levels might suppress spawning.   There was some39
data available to test that hypothesis, but not very much:  six years of data comparing April lake
levels with larval abundance; and relative abundance data for eight older year classes in mass
mortality events, which could be compared with water levels when those fish were spawned.
Looking at those data, the committee found that they suggested that any relationship
between lake levels and larval recruitment is weak or indirect.   With respect to the larval40
abundance data, the committee noted that measurements of larval abundance had a high degree
of sampling variance, so that it was difficult to have confidence in the accuracy of any particular
point.   Five of six points on the graph of spring water levels versus larval abundance suggested41
a reasonably strong correlation between the two.  Discounting the outlying sixth point as either
wrong (due to sampling error) or anomalous (due to the chance variation allowed even by the
most stringent statistical significance tests) probably would have been within the bounds of
accepted scientific practice, particularly since, as the committee pointed out, the conclusion that
spawning success is not related to the availability of spawning habitat “seems counterintuitive.”  42
The committee’s interpretation that lake levels at the time of spawning were not crucial to later
population levels was bolstered by the year class evidence from fish kills, which did not show a
correlation with mean water level during spawning.
The regulatory agencies and the NRC committee agreed that the available data did not
conclusively prove or conclusively disprove the supposition that higher spring lake levels
improved recruiting success.  Scientific judgments interpreting such limited and equivocal data
Michael A. McCarthy et al., Comparing Predictions of Extinction Risk Using Models43
and Subjective Judgment, 26 ACTA OECOLOGIA 67 (2004).
The Klamath Project irrigates only a fraction of the irrigated acreage in the Upper Basin. 44
Doremus and Tarlock, supra note 22, at 345.
NRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 323-3945
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reflect the educated intuition of the scientists making them, but are also nearly inextricably bound
up with those scientists’ views about the appropriate degree of risk of either ecological or
economic harm.  Any judgment based on such a small amount of data has a high probability of
being wrong.  There is some evidence, though, that such judgments are less affected by policy
preferences if they are made with explicit consideration of a model, even a crude one, of the
system concerned.43
2.  Management judgments
Management judgments are judgments about the amenability of various aspects of a
managed system to manipulation, and about the likely response of the system and the political
community to the variety of possible perturbations.  Management decisions, such as choices of
priorities among several possible approaches to solving a problem, are necessarily made in light
of those judgments.  Management judgments are frequently informed by, but hardly ever wholly
determined by, the available scientific evidence.  There can be a strong feedback loop; once
management judgments are made, they can strongly influence the collection and interpretation of
scientific data, which in turn can tend to entrench the original management decisions.
In the Klamath Basin, FWS and NMFS had to make management judgments about where
to focus their regulatory efforts.  Both chose to focus heavily on the Klamath Project, relying on
the section 7 consultation process to drive changes in Project operations.  Other possibilities,
including section 9 enforcement proceedings against private irrigators who divert water above
Upper Klamath Lake,  or section 7 consultation for other federal actions such as management of44
national forest lands in the Lower Basin, were essentially ignored.  That choice came in for
considerable criticism in the final NRC report,  because the committee believed that regulation45
See id. at 327-29.46
Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 22, at 343-49.47
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of the Klamath Project alone would be both inequitable and ineffective.   Before the committee46
issued its final report, we ourselves had called for a broader approach to the Basin’s problems.47
We remain persuaded that any lasting solution to the Klamath conflict must extend
beyond the boundaries of the Klamath Project.  That does not, however, mean that the regulatory
agencies made improper, or even incorrect, management judgments.  The rule of law requires
that regulators enforce applicable statutes, but those statutes often leave them considerable
discretion.  In deciding how to exercise that discretion, they understandably, and appropriately,
take into account both the accessibility to intervention and the leverage provided by different
parts of the system.  In the Klamath situation, regulators were entitled to consider that section 7
consultation proceedings, as angry as they might make people, would almost certainly be less
controversial than section 9 enforcement.  After all, section 7 operates through the intermediary
of another federal agency.  When the section 7 process produced a judgment that the headgates at
Upper Klamath Lake had to be closed, that judgment was endorsed not only by the regulatory
agencies, but also by the Bureau of Reclamation, an agency Project irrigators had every reason to
believe would give full consideration to their interests.  Even so, closure of the headgates
produced a firestorm of outrage that reverberates even today on the web and in the local
community.  A direct attack on irrigators above the Project through section 9 probably would
have produced an even more extreme reaction, likely including charges of black helicopters.
The regulatory agencies also had reasonable grounds to believe that targeting the Klamath
Project would provide the greatest conservation return on enforcement efforts.  The Project,
unlike private irrigators, has a direct line to federal budget decisions.  Its operation is the highest-
profile ongoing federal action in the Basin, and the one with the strongest local political support. 
Reducing federal water deliveries was calculated to bring both attention and a substantial
infusion of federal conservation dollars to the Basin.  Indeed, the water crisis of 2001 appears to
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Klamath Basin Area Office, Klamath River Basin48
Conservation Implementation Program (Program Document, Second Draft, Feb. 2004), available
at http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/CIP/docs/CIP-ProgramDoc.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
Klamath River Watershed Coordination Agreement, available at49
http://www.doi.gov/news/klamathagreement.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
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have had precisely that effect.  Congress and the Department of Interior have pumped money into
a new basin-wide restoration program being developed by the Bureau of Reclamation.   Oregon48
and California have agreed to join the federal government in a new cooperative approach to
addressing the Basin’s environmental woes.   Even with the benefit of hindsight, it cannot be49
said that regulators made a clear error in focusing their efforts on the Klamath Project.  They had
every reason to suppose that the Project, the single largest diverter in the system and a pipeline to
federal funding, would provide the most bang for the regulatory buck.
3.  Policy judgments
Policy judgments are judgments about social goals, the relative importance of those goals,
and the importance of avoiding specific types of errors.  Choices about the extent of scientific
certainty required to justify regulatory action, for example, are policy judgments.  By their very
nature, policy judgments cannot be made on any objective basis.
The sequence of regulatory events that produced the controversial biological opinions of
2001 included a number of policy judgments.  Those policy judgments logically precede, and
provide the context for, the scientific judgments.  Congress has provided vague indications of
how many of these judgments should be made, but has generally left a broad space for agency
discretion.  The regulatory agencies, in turn, frequently leave their policy judgments unexplained,
and even unacknowledged.
The first set of policy judgments in the Klamath sequence were those required in order to
list the suckers and salmon under the ESA.  First, FWS and NOAA Fisheries had to decide which
fish to group together as “species.”  The statute provides only that the term “species” includes
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).50
Dept. of Commerce, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Policy on Applying the51




Dept. of Commerce, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Endangered and Threatened54
Species: Proposed Threatened Status for Three Contiguous ESUs of Coho Salmon Ranging from




subspecies and, for vertebrates, “distinct population segments,” a term not further defined.  50
Identifying groups for protection has been particularly challenging for Pacific salmon.  The
genetic basis of much of the observed life history and morphological variation in salmon is
poorly understood.  Within recognized salmon species, sruns are often largely reproductively
isolated from one another by the time and location of spawning.  Believing that runs should be
protected if they represented a unique evolutionary unit, in 1991, NOAA Fisheries developed a
policy for identifying distinct population segments of salmon.   The policy provides for51
protection of groups that are “substantially reproductively isolated” from others, so that they
promise to evolve as a separate lineage,  and “represent an important component in the52
evolutionary legacy of the species.”   In 1995, NOAA Fisheries identified the coho salmon53
stocks in the Rogue, Klamath, Trinity, and Eel River basins, together with those in several
smaller basins in the same area, as a single distinct population segment.   The agency found a54
relatively large genetic distance between these fish and those from rivers to the north and south
of them,  and noted that tagged fish from this group were more likely than those from further55
north to spend the ocean portion of their life cycle off the California coast than their cousins from
more northerly rivers.   Neither of these distinguishing traits amounted to a bright line.  The56
Id. at 38013.57
Id. at 38014.58
See id. at 38016 (noting that some genetic samples from the Rogue were similar to those59
from Columbia River fish, and one sample from the Elk clustered with Umpqua River fish).
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).60
16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).61
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recognized DPS itself showed considerable genetic diversity,  and the ocean distributions57
overlapped.   Faced with groups of fish that were not perfectly distinct from each other,58
genetically or in their ocean behavior, NOAA Fisheries had to make judgments about where to
draw lines.  It might have excluded the Rogue River salmon from this group, or included those in
the Elk River to the south.   Because nature itself has not provided bright lines, any choice the59
agency made could be criticized as arbitrary.  As is typical of these decisions, the agency
provided essentially no explanation for its particular choice, sticking with general references to
the genetic and ocean distribution patterns.
Once they had identified listable “species,” FWS and NOAA Fisheries had to make
policy judgments about the degree of acceptable risk to those species.  The statute defines a
species as “endangered” if it is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a substantial portion of
its range,”  and as threatened if it is “likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future.”  60 61
That language makes it clear that endangered species must be in worse condition than threatened
ones, but can hardly be considered a definitive explanation of the degree of risk needed to
support listing in either category.  The listing agencies have not made any effort to describe in
general terms what degree of risk over what period of time they think makes a species
endangered or threatened.  Their individual listing decisions are also frequently quite opaque on
the issue, no doubt in part because the data are often so limited that robust estimates of
probability of extinction are difficult or impossible.  In listing the coho salmon, NOAA Fisheries
noted that the population had dramatically declined from historic levels, although the Rogue
Dept. of Commerce, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Endangered and62
Threatened Species: Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24588-24591 (May 6,
1997).
Dept. of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Serv., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and63
Plants: Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53
Fed. Reg. 27130, 27131 (July 18, 1988).
This is the operative language of ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).64
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added).65
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River population had recently bounced back a bit; that coho were absent from many streams in
the region that had once harbored them; and that a high proportion of the naturally spawning fish
in the region were first-generation hatchery fish.   In listing the suckers, FWS noted that the62
populations had declined drastically (by as much as 50%) in the last several years, and that no
significant recruitment of young fish had been observed for 18 years.63
Once the species were listed and consultation was begun on the effects of the Klamath
Project, NMFS and FWS had to determine what level of risk it would consider to fall below the
jeopardy threshold and precisely what it means to “insure” that jeopardy is “not likely.”   The64
Services’ joint regulations suggest considerable caution in this determination:  actions that
“appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery in the wild” are considered to
jeopardize the continued existence of the species.   As with their listing determinations, the65
regulatory agencies did not clearly address, however, the extent to which they believed the
Bureau’s proposed operation of the project would reduce the likelihood either of survival or of
recovery of the listed species.
4.  Inevitable intertwining
As these examples should make clear, even with the best of intentions it is very difficult
to separate out the three different kinds of judgment.  When the Services opined that the Bureau’s
proposed operation of the Project would cause jeopardy, although they did not openly say so they
were necessarily making both scientific and policy judgments, and undoubtedly those judgments
It is hardly surprising that FWS will not release jeopardy opinions (unlike no-jeopardy66
opinions) without the signature of the regional director.  U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. and Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act Consultation Handbook: Procedures for
Conducting Section 7 Consultations and Conferences 1-4 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter Consultation
Handbook].
NRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 4.67
Id. at 314.68
William M. Lewis, Jr., Klamath Basin Fishes: Argument is No Substitute for Evidence,69
28(3) FISHERIES 20, 21 (Mar. 2003).
As explained below, the available empirical evidence is directly to the contrary.  See70
infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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were influenced by unstated management judgments about the reaction their decisions would
provoke.   The NRC review committee may also have had a hard time separating out these66
distinct judgments.  The committee was formally asked only to review the science underlying the
2001 biological opinions.   The committee read that charge (unnecessarily, in our view) as67
requiring that, in deciding whether scientific evidence adequately supported the regulatory
requirements, it apply norms of research science that require high levels of certainty to support a
claim of “proof.”   In addition, the committee’s evaluation of the science may have been affected68
by its policy preferences.  The committee chair wrote in an exchange in the journal Fisheries that
“it is obvious” that the regulatory agencies will make professional judgments in a way that
privileges the species they are charged with protecting, but that “where the economic stakes are
high,” special attention should be given to the role of speculation in those decisions.   It seems69
that the committee chair, at least, believed that over-regulation would generally be the norm,70
and that regulators would need to be reined in when their zeal threatened to impose high
economic costs on society.  That the committee as a whole may have shared this view is
supported by its divergent treatment of the lake level and diversion point screening requirements
in the 2001 FWS biological opinion.  The call for higher lake levels was criticized because it
lacked substantial scientific support.  But the committee endorsed FWS’ call to screen the main
diversion point from Upper Klamath Lake to the Project’s irrigation works.  The committee
NRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 237.71
In fact that particular policy judgment, although tenable and perhaps even appealing on72
its face, is rejected by the ESA, which establishes a uniform federal duty to avoid jeopardy and
adverse modification of critical habitat, independent of the economic benefits of the proposed
action.
23
acknowledged that the “benefits of this measure to the population are unknown;”  presumably it71
felt this less controversial step, which did not threaten to deprive farmers of their livelihood,
required less supporting evidence.  If the committee was indeed inclined to demand clearer
scientific support for the biological opinions because of their perceived economic consequences,
that policy judgment may have affected its scientific judgments.72
IV.  CONTROLLING REGULATORY JUDGMENT
As these examples drawn from the Klamath conflict illustrate, the real battleground in
arguments about the use of science in natural resource regulation is typically not the data
themselves but the judgments, scientific, management, and regulatory, used to interpret the data
and translate them into regulations.  Environmentalists calling for more or better science do so
because they think current science mandates have not done enough to achieve substantive
conservation goals.  Critics in the regulated community, by contrast, believe current science
mandates have not done enough to protect against unnecessary and unproductive regulation. 
Both sides claim to want more science and less judgment, but a more accurate assessment is that
both want the inevitable judgments to be more closely aligned with their policy preferences.  The
fundamental disagreement is over the appropriate burden of proof.  Environmentalists want
regulatory agencies to be more cautious about approving activities that may affect listed species,
applying the precautionary principle to impose protective regulations even if the supporting
evidence is less than certain.  The regulated community, on the other hand, wants the agencies to
be more cautious about imposing regulatory restrictions on their actions, and therefore calls for
application of the very demanding standards of certainty imposed in the research science
For a general explanation of these contrasting approaches to regulation, see J.B. Ruhl,73
The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555 (2004).  For a
comparison of the incentives and costs of error that might call for differing standards of proof in
regulatory as opposed to research science, see Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future
of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004).
JOHN PASSMORE, THE PERFECTIBILITY OF MAN 204 (1970). 74
See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.75
2004).
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community on claims of proof.73
Both sides, however, tend to frame their arguments in the political arena as calls for more
scientific decisionmaking, relying on a widespread misperception (which they may share) that
science can provide objective, perfectly rational, decisions.  Both, therefore, end up promoting a
debate about “good” versus “bad” (or “sound” versus “junk”) science.  That debate, which has
taken on Miltonic proportions, is rooted in the endless and futile search for a perfect world.  The
horror and brutality of the 20th century destroyed the progressive vision of progress through
science, reason and technology.  Chicago school economics destroyed the idea of an objective,
expert public interest.  The Enlightenment idea that the physical sciences can be the basis of
perfect rationality, though, lives on.  As John Passmore observed, “the Enlighteners accepted the
Socratic doctrine that vice is always a form of ignorance, that if man once learns what is best for
him to do, he will necessarily act in that way.”74
Proponents of science-based decisionmaking on both the right and left look to science to
produce the perfect decision; both sides apparently will accept nothing less.  Opponents of
specific conservation actions want to know exactly how many species those species or individual
members of protected species those actions will save; and opponents of risk-based conservation
decisions want to know exactly how many will be killed.   The search for scientific perfection in75
this context, however, is misguided for two fundamental reasons.  First, as sensible ecologists
have constantly warned, ecology and the related biological sciences will never reach the precision
and elegance of physics and mathematics.  Second, the search for the perfect science-based
See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973)76
(Bazelon, J., concurring) (“Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does
not know.  I may be wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not know enough about
dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide whether or
not the government’s approach to these matters is statistically valid.”).
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decision deflects attention from the real issue, which is whether the decision is legitimate.  One
of the strengths of the law is that it has never sought perfection or even truth in the absolute
sense, being satisfied with the more attainable goal of legitimacy.  The scientific attributes of
reason and accuracy are necessary components of legitimacy, but we have only traditionally
expected that decisionmakers make a good faith effort to reach a justifiable decision in light of
available information.  In the context of natural resource regulation, the key legitimacy question
is not whether the variety of judgments that go into regulatory decisions are objectively correct or
certain, but whether they are adequately serving legitimately chosen societal goals.
A.  Conventional Controls Do Not Closely Constrain Judgments
As we have seen, natural resource regulation and management decisions are typically not
closely constrained by the available data, because those data are so incomplete and ambiguous.  It
is not surprising that people on both sides of the political spectrum, distrusting the regulatory
agencies, want regulatory decisions to be more closely constrained.  Indeed, the science mandates
that pepper conservation statutes were originally intended in large part to increase agency
accountability to oversight.  In practice, however, they can have precisely the opposite effect,
insulating agency judgments from oversight by the courts and the political process.
Courts consider themselves ill-suited to intervene in the situations which leave the
greatest room for judgment:  when agencies make decisions with a highly technical content in the
face of substantial uncertainty.  Judges are acutely aware that they lack specialized scientific
expertise, and therefore are not well qualified to oversee the exercise of scientific judgment.  76
They are also reluctant to impose limits on agency policy judgments where Congress appears to
have delegated to the agency responsibility for striking the balance between competing policy
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).77
Examples include Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash.78
1988) (holding that FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to list the northern spotted
owl in the face of unanimous expert opinion, “including that of its own expert, that the owl is
facing extinction”); and Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1236-40
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (remanding decision not to list orca population because decision rested on
assumption that all orcas worldwide belong to the same taxon, an assumption the agency’s
scientific advisory panel had unanimously rejected).
See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (1988) (“In light of the ESA79
requirement that the agencies use the best scientific and commercial data available to insure that
protected species are not jeopardized, the FWS cannot ignore available biological information,”
or refuse to use that information to develop projections about the impact of proposed actions on
listed species); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Badgley, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1151
(E.D. Cal. 2000) (“there is no indication that Defendants considered substantial evidence that
suggests that the splittail should not be listed, despite the significant contrary data and opinion”
of the state fish and wildlife agency).
See, e.g., National Association of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835 (9th Cir.80
2003) (holding that FWS inadequately explained its designation of Arizona population of cactus
ferruginous pygmy owl as a distinct population segment); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
United States Dept. of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that FWS
had failed to adequately explain its conclusion that designation of critical habitat would not be
beneficial to the coastal California gnatcatcher); American Rivers v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 255-57 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that FWS had failed to
adequately explain why recent improvements in the condition of listed species justified “dramatic
departure” from the conclusions of an earlier biological opinion); American Wildlands v. Norton,
193 F. Supp. 2d 244, 254 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that FWS had failed to offer “a scientifically




Natural resource regulatory decisions often share both of these attributes.  Courts
therefore tend to approach them gingerly.  Scientific judgments are generally set aside only in the
most egregious situations, as when it is clear that there is a major inconsistency between the
underlying information and the ultimate conclusion.  Federal agencies may not ignore a clear
scientific consensus, especially if their own experts agree with that consensus.   They may not78
entirely ignore relevant  scientific information.   Finally, they must offer a coherent explanation79
of how their decision rationally follows from, or at least is consistent with, the available
evidence.   The policy judgments that are necessarily implied or closely intertwined with80
scientific judgments in natural resource regulatory decisions are often simply not recognized, or
Common Sense Salmon Recovery v. Evans, 329 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2004).81
City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927 (DC Cir. 1989).82
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUMBIA L.83
REV. 1613, 1674-77 (1995).
See id. at 1627-28.84
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perhaps not acknowledged, by the courts.
Management judgments, which deal with which parts of a problem to tackle first and how
fiercely to tackle them, are also resistant to judicial review.  The courts recognize that agencies
must enjoy enforcement discretion, and discretion to set priorities as to how to address multi-
faceted problems.  Holding otherwise could make it impossible to address these problems by
allowing all the multiple responsible parties to escape responsibility by pointing fingers at others’
contributions.  So courts have ruled, for example, that plaintiffs concerned that they may be
forced to protect salmon habitat cannot challenge the regulatory agencies’ alleged failure to
adequately restrict fishing pressure,  and that species can be listed under the ESA without81
necessarily showing that listing will ameliorate all threats.   something about Natomas Basin82
decision here?
The political process does affect agency judgments, but not in a way that is likely to
accurately reflect societal goals.  Although conservation statutes generally provide opportunities
for public input, it is extraordinarily difficult for the lay public to play an effective role in shaping
highly technical regulatory decisions.   The barriers to participation are exacerbated by the83
tendency of agencies to hide the policy judgments they make behind the scientific ones.  Those
decisions may be difficult to recognize, let alone challenge.   Taking the example of the Klamath84
conflict, few members of the public are likely to have the expertise, or the patience, to grapple
with the details of the available evidence about the relationship between lake levels and sucker
well-being.  
That highly technical regulatory judgments are not accessible to the general public does
See id. at 1677.85
Even individual legislators, particularly those with powerful committee positions, can86
exert political pressures that push the agencies toward actions inconsistent with the intent of
seemingly clear statutes like the ESA.  See generally J.R. deShazo and Jody Freeman, The
Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1443 (2003).
Dan will supply a note on how cost-benefit analysis plays into this mix87
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not make them immune to political pressures.  Instead, it skews those pressures.  Only the best-
funded interests, which are not likely to favor conservation, will be effectively represented in
regulatory proceedings that turn on those sorts of issues.   Moreover, the opacity of technical85
decisions can allow agencies to hide their political choices from the view of courts or voters.  
The technical nature of natural resource regulatory decisions, therefore, can actually undermine
the ability of courts and the public to hold agencies to the goals articulated by Congress.86
B.  Do Regulatory Judgments Fit Societal Goals?
That natural resource regulatory decisions involve a substantial measure of judgment, and
that the exercise of that judgment is not likely to be closely overseen by courts or voters, are not
causes for concern in and of themselves.  Those aspects of regulatory decisionmaking are
worrisome only if and to the extent that agency judgments in practice run counter to societal
goals reflected in legislation.  Our analysis here is intentionally descriptive, rather than
normative.  We believe it is possible to identify at least roughly the trade-offs Congress directed
the regulatory agencies to make, and that the degree of correspondence between agency decisions
and that direction is a legitimate test of whether agency judgments are being made appropriately.
Federal natural resource laws often have multiple, even competing goals.  But basically
the modern statutes embody a commitment to give the environment more weight than it
traditionally had been given when it comes into conflict with extractive or development interests. 
They were adopted when it became clear that pursuing economic goals without adequate
attention to the environment was causing serious environmental degradation.  They exist to
counteract what would otherwise be unopposed economic pressures.   Their science mandates87
Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity,88
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991).
16 U.S.C. § 1531(a).89
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).90
Id. at 184.91
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).92
16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).93
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were primarily intended to serve that goal by limiting the role of economic and political pressures
in the regulatory process.
The ESA, source of the most frequent and intense controversies over natural resource
management in the United States, is perhaps the clearest example.  It was enacted in 1973
specifically because earlier, less strongly regulatory, federal statutes had failed to stem the tide of
extinctions.   Its regulatory provisions are supported by an explicit Congressional finding that88
“various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation.”   The first time the Supreme Court encountered the ESA, it famously described89
the law as giving endangered species “the highest of priorities”  and requiring their protection90
“whatever the cost.”   The law has since been amended so that it is no longer so single-minded. 91
It now allows development so long as it that development is compatible with conservation,  and92
provides a narrow exemption procedure if, after a trial-type hearing, a cabinet-level committee
finds that the benefits of a project clearly outweigh those of any alternative consistent with
conservation.   Those changes have not altered the basic ordering of priorities; the overriding93
goal of the law remains conservation in the face of development pressures.
This history explains why the ESA is not neutral about the use of a precautionary
framework.  It requires some degree of caution in order to achieve the overriding goal of
conservation.  That’s why it requires that decisions rest on the “best available science,” instead
Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670, 679 (D.D.C. 1997).94
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.95
See, e.g., deShazo & Freeman, supra note 85; Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to Be96
Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42
J.L. & ECON. 29 (1999); Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in
Endangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND ECON. 1 (1996); David S. Wilcove, What Exactly Is
an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S. Endangered Species List, 1985-1991, 7
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87 (1993); U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species:
Factors Associated with Delayed Listing Decisions (1993); STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE
POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982); U.S. General
Accounting Office, Endangered Species: A Controversial Issue Needing Resolution (1979).
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of mandating some specific threshold level of scientific support.  That does not mean that species
cannot be subjected to any risk; the agencies retain significant discretion as to how much risk is
acceptable.  But it does mean there has to be a finger on the scale, of some indeterminate size, on
the side of the species.  The regulatory agencies cannot, for example, require conclusive evidence
as a prerequisite to listing a species.   It also means that, at a minimum, the economic costs of94
protection cannot by themselves be the basis of a less protective stance unless the statutory
exemption process is invoked or Congress grants a legislative exemption.  When the regulated
community demands “sounder science,” it is trying to replace the current, vaguely precautionary,
direction of the statute with the very high threshold of certainty that characterizes claims of
“proof” in controlled research science.
Of course, without going to the extreme of requiring virtual certainty to justify regulation,
one could worry that the underspecified ESA directive to use caution invites unnecessary over-
regulation by a mission-driven regulatory agency.  The chair of the Klamath NRC committee
shared that concern.   On its face, that is a plausible initial assumption.  The available evidence,95
however, contradicts it.  There is strong evidence that the regulatory agencies do not list species
whose conservation predictably conflicts with economic activities unless and until forced to do
so by litigation.   The evidence is less overwhelming with respect to section 7, perhaps because96
evaluation is more difficult, but it is clear that biological opinions rarely find jeopardy, and when
they do they then go out of their way to devise RPAs that will impose as little regulatory burden
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.97
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, ___ (1993).
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Svc., Biological Opinion: Klamath Project Operations 55-5698
(May 31, 2002).  The justification for this limitation was that the Project should only have to
provide additional water in proportion to the extent of its withdrawals of water within the
watershed.  That portion of the 2002 Biological Opinion was subsequently overturned by a
reviewing court, because there was no assurance that the additional water necessary to assure
salmon persistence would be forthcoming.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, No. C 02-2006 SBA (July 15, 2003).
Independent peer reviews sought by the regulatory agencies for ESA listing decisions,99
critical habitat designations, and recovery plans have almost always agreed with the agency
decision.  U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-803, Endangered Species: Fish and Wildlife
Service Uses Best Available Science to Make Listing Decisions, But Additional Guidance
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as possible.   In the Klamath context, for example, NMFS in its 2002 biological opinion found97
that Project operations would jeopardize the coho, but required only that the Bureau provide
roughly half the water flow NMFS thought the fish required in the mainstem Klamath.   While98
the regulatory agencies may well perceive conservation as their primary mission, they are clearly
vulnerable to focused political pressure against conservation measures.  In that broad sense,
therefore, agency judgments appear to be less conservation-oriented than is called for by
legislated societal goals.
Furthermore, limitations in the available information can lead to inaccuracies in scientific
judgments, which in turn can infect regulatory decisions.  Where that is the case, even if
regulatory agencies summon the political courage to mandate conservation measures, those
measures might not prove effective.  That would obviously decrease the likelihood that societal
conservation goals would be met.  In addition, it would tend to increase the level of political
controversy over time, as the regulated community’s losses are not balanced by conservation
benefits.
It is very difficult to evaluate the accuracy of regulatory decisions, but we suspect it may
be a far more significant shortcoming than conscious overregulation, which appears quite rare. 
Most outside evaluations have given at least a qualified endorsement to the science behind
regulatory decisions.   But several have noted how little information is available, and few have99
Needed for Critical Habitat Designations 21–22 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-803.  The regulatory agencies also fare well in most
NRC reviews.  There have been at least six NRC reviews of specific ESA decisions.  Only one,
the Klamath review, has disagreed fundamentally with the regulatory action taken.
FWS must report every two years on the status of all species listed under the ESA.  The100
most recent report shows 21% of listed species delining, 30% stable, and only 6% improving. 
The status of 39% of listed species is reported as “uncertain.”  U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
Recovery Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2001-2002, at 10 (undated), available at
http://endangered.fws.gov/recovery/reports_to_congress/2001-2002/report_text.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005). 
42 U.S.C. § 7412.101
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).102
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tried to evaluate the likelihood of conservation success.  Data on the status of listed species show
that many are not noticeably improving.   That data is difficult to interpret, however.  It could100
simply confirm that the regulatory agencies are too timid to require needed measures, it could
reveal that the agencies lack authority over important threats, or it could indicate that required
conservation measures are not working as expected.
C.  How Might Regulatory Judgments Be Tied More Closely to Societal Goals?
In theory, Congress could readily solve the problem of regulatory agencies which enjoy
too much discretion and cannot be counted upon to exercise that discretion appropriately in the
service of societal goals.  The statutes could be amended to be much more prescriptive.  That has
sometimes been done in the pollution context; for example, when EPA moved too slowly to
regulate hazardous air pollutants, Congress enacted a list of such pollutants and ordered EPA to
regulate them on a specific schedule.   Without getting quite that prescriptive, Congress can be101
clearer about how agencies should treat uncertainty.  It has done that, for instance, in the Clean
Air Act by requiring that EPA set National Ambient Air Quality Standards that “allowing an
adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health,”  and in the Clean Water102
Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load provision, which directs EPA to set TMDLs with “a margin of
safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).103
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U.104
ILL. L. REV. 181; William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of
Deception in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377
(1989).
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effluent limitations and water quality.”103
A legislative solution of this sort is not likely for the ESA, or for that matter for the
federal land management statutes or other natural resource laws.  Lists are simply impractical. 
Numerical bounds, such as requirements that species face a prescribed extinction risk before they
can be listed, are not useful in the face of very weak scientific information because extinction
probabilities cannot be calculated with any accuracy.  Finally, Congress has shown no interest in
facing up to the political costs of making these choices explicitly.  It is more politically
advantageous to declare aspirational goals in ringing terms, but leave the implementing agencies
with the hard task of determining the extent to which those goals will be achieved.104
Without openly addressing the exercise of agency discretion, however, Congress and the
executive branch make numerous decisions that affect that discretion.  Making effective policy
use of scientific information is as much an institutional challenge as it is a scientific one. 
Decisions about how to structure agencies, advisory committees, and interactions with various
constituencies might seem like very indirect and incomplete means of controlling agency
judgments, but they may be the strongest tools available in the context of natural resource
regulation under uncertainty.
1.  The choice of decisionmaker
The first key choice is the assignment of decisionmaking authority.  Regulatory outcomes
may strongly depend upon which of two or more competing agencies is delegated authority to
determine what scientific information to collect, interpret, and apply scientific information.  Even
within a single agency, the distribution of authority can be critical.
Most obviously, if conservation is the primary, or even an important secondary, goal,
See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U.105
ILL. L. REV. 299, 305; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093
(2000).
16 U.S.C. § 1801 - 1883.106
See Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question:107
Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649, 654-55 (2003).
Id.; National Marine Fisheries Service, 1999 Report to Congress on Apportionment of108
Membership on the Regional Fishery Management Councils (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2).109
Eagle & Thompson, supra note 106, 654-55.110
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decisionmaking authority must not rest with those whose economic interest depends upon
development or extractive activities.  Even scientific judgments must be dissociated from
economic self-interest.  Where the evidence is equivocal or even short of overwhelming, people
tend to interpret it as consistent with their own interests.   Short-term self-interest can also drive105
management and policy judgments in directions that systematically disfavor conservation, even
in the face of an apparent long-term financial interest in conservation.
A striking illustration comes from fisheries regulation in the United States, where putting
the power to make initial decisions on annual quotas in the hands of the fishing industry, even
subject to oversight by a regulatory agency, has been a conservation disaster.  Under the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,  regional Fishery Management106
Councils propose annual quotas, on the basis of stock assessments performed by NOAA
scientists and reviewed by scientific advisory bodies to the Councils.   Council membership is107
dominated by fishing interests, commercial and recreational.   Quotas must be based on the best108
available scientific evidence.   They are supposed to prevent overfishing or, in the case of109
already overfished stocks, provide for recovery to maximum sustainable yield.  In two case
studies, Eagle and Thompson found regulatory judgments contributed to significant
overfishing.   In one of their two case studies, the initial scientific assessments appeared to be110
Eagle and Thompson note in this case study that the Pacific Fishery Management111
Council appeared to become more conservation oriented in the early 1990s.  They do not offer an
explanation for the shift.  Id. at 670.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN112
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 11-13 (1996); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32, 46 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 48, 68 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
  Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector General, FDA’s Review113
Process for New Drug Applications:  A Management Review 12 (Mar. 2003), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-01-00590.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
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reasonably accurate, but the regional Council systematically proposed quotas either above those
recommended by the scientific advisory bodies or at the very top of the range deemed
scientifically plausible.  In the other, the scientists appear to have systematically overestimated
the available catch, and in addition the Council exceeded their recommendations for several
years.111
Financial conflicts are not the only source of biases that can skew regulatory judgments. 
Agency mission and culture can have a similar effect.  It is not surprising, for example, that 
FWS and the Bureau of Reclamation came to very different conclusions about the needs of the
endangered suckers in the Klamath Basin based on the same underlying data.  Experts are no
more immune to interpretive biases than lay persons.   Recent news coverage of the Food and112
Drug Administration’s drug review process illustrates the extent to which the perceived
organizational mission can override individual views.  A survey conducted by the inspector
general of the Department of Health and Human Services found that nearly one in five FDA
scientists had felt pressured to recommend approval of a new drug against their own best
judgment.113
The extent to which decisions are centralized or decentralized may also be important, as
may the geographic location of the office where decisions are made.  Greater decentralization is
likely to weaken the extent of control exercised by the political appointees at the top level of
The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, which administers the Clean Water Act’s114
wetlands filling permit provisions, is highly decentralized.  A recent General Accounting Office
study found that district offices, which are responsible for most decisions to assert federal
jurisdiction over wetlands, interpreted the scope of federal jurisdiction very differently.  General
Accounting Office, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District
Office Practices in Determining Jurisdiction (GAO 04-297) (Feb. 2004).  The Bush
administration has tried to exert tighter control over decisions to regulate at the boundary of
federal authority by issuing a memorandum requiring that such decisions be elevated to Corps
headquarters in D.C.  Id. at 14.
See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated115
as moot 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (Bureau argued that its irrigation contracts left no
discretion, and therefore its operations were not subject to ESA consultation requirements).
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agency administration.  Central political control will be especially difficult to maintain if
judgments are delegated to the field office level, where they will be made by career employees
rather than political appointees.   The substantive effect of such weakened control will depend,114
obviously, on both the views of the administration and those of the local agency officials.
Where the field office is located in a resource-dependent community and agency
personnel tend to have long tenure in a single location, regulatory judgments made by local
career employees are likely to favor local interests.  That should be even more true if the agency
views its mission as promoting or supporting local industry.  The Bureau of Reclamation, for
example, in its 2001 biological assessment for operation of the Klamath Project, interpreted the
scientific evidence to permit water deliveries to Project irrigators that would reduce lake levels
and river flows below historic minimums.  The Bureau has long perceived irrigators served by its
projects as its clients; it works hard to satisfy their needs.   Compounding that mission115
orientation, the biological assessment was prepared by the Klamath Falls office that operates the
Project.  Bureau employees living in Klamath Falls are acutely aware of the social value of
agriculture to the local community, and have absorbed local beliefs about the economic value of
agriculture.  By contrast, the FWS and NOAA Fisheries biological opinions, which called for
considerably lower deliveries, were prepared for agencies with important conservation missions,
by employees in Sacramento and Long Beach, respectively.  Those employees would have been
insulated by both mission and distance from the economic impacts on upper Basin agricultural
GERALD HOLTON, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION 241 (1998 ed.).116
Ecologists are more likely than the general public to assign intrinsic value to the natural117
world.  See Paul A. Sabatier & Matthew Zafonte, The Views of Bay/Delta Water Policy Activists
on Endangered Species Issues, 2 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 131, 145




Finally, the training and professional identity of the individuals who make judgments
should be expected to play a role.  In particular, the extent to which the decisionmakers are
trained in the natural sciences, and identify themselves as biologists, will likely play an important
role in their scientific and their policy judgments.  On the one hand, research scientists, those
trained to the level of a doctoral degree or with equivalent professional research experience, are
likely to have strongly internalized research norms against prematurely asserting that a
connection has been established between a specific action and species decline.  That
acculturation might work against conservation.  On the other hand, scientists tend to be unusually
devoted to their work, and intensely focused on the particular area or system which they choose
to study.   For those who study ecology, conservation biology, or an individual endangered116
species, that absorption in their work tends to bring with it a correspondingly intense interest in
the long-term health of the environment in general and their focal interests in particular.  It still
may not be the norm for these scientists to be politically active, but most of them share the view
that conservation is more important than economic development.   That view will tend to push117
their judgments in a more protectionist direction.
We suspect that those scientists who choose to go into agency, rather than academic, jobs,
will feel more strongly about protecting species, and less strongly about the norms of academic
science.  On balance, therefore, we would expect science mandates, because they tend to
strengthen the role of agency scientists relative to other career employees and political
appointees, to encourage more strongly conservationist regulatory judgments.  That effect should
be intensified by decisionmaking structures that give agencies with a conservation mission a
See Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the118
Bush Administration, __ ECOLOGY L.Q. __ (forthcoming 2005).
Consultation Handbook, supra note 65, at 1-6.119
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strong role, such as the ESA’s consultation procedures.  The Bush Administration, which does
not favor conservation, has made considerable use of the converse approach, shifting
decisionmaking power away from conservation agencies to agencies with extractive missions and
away from minimizing the role of conservation scientists through aggressive oversight by
political appointees.118
2.  Tools for increasing transparency
We explained earlier that agency scientific, management, and policy judgments may
escape public oversight yet remain vulnerable to focused political pressures, because they are
hidden under a veneer of scientific opacity and claims of objectivity.  Any steps that make the
various types of judgment that go into regulatory decisions more openly apparent should help
balance the political scales.  Transparency is, of course, not a panacea.  Disclosure does not
solve, and can even exacerbate, political conflict.  But by revealing informational gaps and
political judgments, it can focus the debate, and potentially reveal an expanded menu of choices. 
a.  Demanding transparency through judicial review
 Transparency is difficult to achieve, given that both Congress and the agencies seem to
believe that hiding their judgments is in their best political interest, and that agencies fear that
candor will increase their vulnerability to judicial reversal.  Courts could increase transparency
by demanding clearer explanations of the policy judgments that necessarily underlie regulatory
decisions, and deferring to those judgments when they are explained.  For example, FWS and
NOAA Fisheries have typically avoided explaining in ESA listing or consultation decisions what
degree of risk they regard as unacceptable.  They have explained in their Section 7 Handbook
that they believe they must give the benefit of the doubt to the species when faced with data
gaps.   They have not, however, explained what gaps give rise to that duty, or how much doubt119
See supra note 79.120
42 U.S.C. § 4321 - 4370d.121




can be overcome by this precautionary approach.  In individual decisions, they do not explain to
what extent they believe they are giving the benefit of the doubt to the species, or what
uncertainties prompt them to do so.
Courts, which seem quite prepared to demand careful, coherent explanations of the
scientific leaps the agencies make,  surely could be just as demanding with respect to policy120
judgments.  Like the parents of teenagers, courts should reinforce socially desirable behavior by
rewarding candor and punishing secretiveness.  Congress has done precisely that by mandating
environmental review of proposed federal actions under the National Environmental Policy
Act.   Where Congress has not directly demanded candor, courts can and should take up the121
slack.  One good example from the natural resources context is Fishermen’s Dock Cooperative,
Inc. v. Brown.   A coalition of commercial fishers challenged a quota for summer flounder set122
by the Department of Commerce.  A scientific advisory committee had selected a quota one
standard deviation below the mean estimated recruitment over the previous five years.  Plaintiffs
claimed that the Magnuson Act’s requirement that quotas be set using the best scientific data
available mandated that the quota be set instead at the mean annual recruitment level.
The court disagreed.  It noted that use of the best scientific data need not mandate “one
and only one possible quota.”   The court noted that, given the uncertainty of the data, any123
specific quota could be attacked as arbitrary.  Under the circumstances, the agency “necessarily
had some discretion to decide what precise degree of assurance it would seek within the
uncertainty of the data.”   It had explained why it chose the lower quota, essentially noting that124
its primary goal was to stay below the target mortality and that some assumptions in the model it
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used could be optimistic.
The Fishermen’s Dock decision is a good model in three respects.  First, the court
recognized that the best available science frequently will not point to a single, clearly identifiable
management choice.  Second, it realized that the selection of a particular choice within the range
identified by the available science depended upon value choices.  Third, the court gave the
agency’s decision greater deference because it had explained both the scientific and value bases
for the particular choice made.  Courts should also take the next step, remanding decisions where
such transparency is lacking.  Courts should be on the lookout for (and litigants should point out)
circumstances in which regulatory decisions necessarily involve value choices.  Agencies should
have to explain those choices, with reference to their goals, their understanding of the degree of
uncertainty in the data, and the extent to which they have employed a precautionary approach.  At
the same time, courts need to rein in their own tendency to interfere with agency policy
judgments within boundaries left open by the legislature.  Agencies must be assured that
revealing their political choices will not undermine their judicial position.  Instead of effectively
pressuring agencies to engage in a science charade, courts should provide incentives for the
agencies to reveal their political choices, thereby facilitating political accountability.
b.  Making the views of scientists public
Requiring that the unvarnished views of agency scientists or advisory panels, as well as
the final agency decision, be publicly revealed would also significantly increase transparency and
accountability.  Conservationists have always assumed, or at least hoped, that science mandates
would strengthen the hand of conservation scientists in natural resource regulation.  In practice,
this effect has been limited because control of agency decisions ultimately rests with political
appointees.  Those political appointees have proven themselves quite willing to reject the
recommendations of agency scientists, especially in the last four years.  They can frequently do
so with political impunity because the public generally lacks access to those recommendations
unless they are leaked to the press.
Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (D.N.M. 2004);125
Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 198 F.R.D. 540 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Center for
Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. Civ. 01-409 TUC ACM (D. Ariz. 2002), 2002 WL
32136200.
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Currently, agency scientific recommendations may not even be discoverable in litigation;
some courts have ruled that they are covered by the deliberative process privilege,  which125
protects internal pre-decision discussions in order to allow agencies to engage in frank and
complete consideration of the decision.  Ideally, Congress would mandate public disclosure of
the recommendations or reports of agency scientists.  It would be simple enough to require that
agency biologists make their drafts public, and that supervisors who make or require changes in
the original analysis publicly acknowledge and explain those changes.  Failing congressional
action, courts could exclude such recommendations or reports from the deliberative process
privilege.  Where Congress has directed agencies to use the best available scientific information
in their decisions, the public is entitled to know what agency scientists think of the scientific
data, without filtering by political appointees.
That does not mean that agency scientists must always control the ultimate decisions, or
even that they can necessarily be trusted not to mix policy judgments into their scientific
evaluations.  Making the reports of agency or advisory scientists immediately public could invest
those reports with unjustified power.  Scientific judgments are most likely to be accurate if they
are made by scientists with both broad experience in the relevant field and specific knowledge of
this system or species.  But, as explained above, scientific judgments can be difficult to untangle
from policy or management judgments.  Delegation of policy judgments to agency scientists can
be defended as a needed counterweight to development pressures from mission-oriented agencies
and financial beneficiaries.  We tend to think that in the end that will prove a self-defeating
proposition, however.  Agencies may find ways to select for scientists who fall on the less
conservation-oriented, or at least on the less activist side of the political spectrum.  Alternatively,
supervisors may begin to openly reject scientific advice because they believe that advice is
Eagle & Thompson, supra note 106, at ___ provide data suggesting just such an effect126
when fishery science advisors consciously reduced their estimates of allowable catch in an effort
to combat the tendency of managers to set regulatory targets too high.
These documents must be practically, as well as legally, accessible.  In their evaluation127
of fisheries regulation, Eagle and Thompson noted how difficult it was for them to find and dig
out of the extensive record the advice of NOAA’s Fishery Science Centers and regional council
advisory committees on appropriate quotas.  They suggested that the practical unavailability of
that information might contribute to the willingness of the regional councils to ignore scientific
advice.  Id. at 676.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).128
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deliberately skewed.126
We suggest that both the scientific and policy advice of agency scientists should be
exposed, to the extent possible, to public view.  That might be done, for example, by requiring
that the evaluations of agency scientists be included in the public record, but also structuring
those evaluations to separate scientific from other judgments.  Even if agency scientists are just
as inclined as agency politicians to hide their political judgments, and just as skilled at doing so,
mandating public release of their advice should help expose those judgments.  Agency
decisionmakers who must disclose internal scientific advice counter to their ultimate decision
will face political and judicial pressures to explain the discrepancy.  That will give them
incentives to reveal the policy judgments both in their ultimate decision and in the
recommendations of their scientists.127
c.  Outside scientific review
It is difficult to object to the concept of peer review.  Outside review is viewed, both
within and beyond the scientific community, as a tool for increasing the accuracy of scientific
judgments, and for holding those judgments within accepted professional boundaries.  It is
generally required prior to publication of results in scientific journals.  The Supreme Court has
endorsed its role in assuring scientific credibility.   Reformers, particularly those from the anti-128
regulatory camp, have focused on requiring peer review of highly technical regulatory
These calls for peer review often betray their antiregulatory leanings through their129
asymmetric structure.  The Sound Science and Endangered Species Act Planning Act, HR 1662,
for example, which emerged from the House Resources Committee in the 108th Congress but
never made it to floor action, would have required peer review of decisions to add a species to
the protected list after review, but not of decisions not to list a species, and of jeopardy but not of
no-jeopardy consultation decisions.
Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act130
Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34270 (July 1, 1994).  The wildlife agencies apply this policy to critical
habitat designations as well as proposals to add species to the protected lists.
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-803, Endangered Species: Fish and Wildlife131
Service Uses Best Available Science to Make Listing Decisions, But Additional Guidance




Peer review on the journal model, however, is not an effective method of constraining
regulatory judgments within the broad sideboards already established by judicial review under
the APA’s arbitrary or capricious standard.  Journals typically send a submitted paper to several
experts in the field.  Reviewers evaluate the paper’s quality on the basis of the methods used to
collect data, statistical analyses, whether prior studies have been appropriately acknowledged,
and whether claims based on the data fall within professional boundaries.  Journal-style peer
review is routinely sought on ESA listing decisions, critical habitat designations, and recovery
plans.   It almost never finds flaws in the agency action.   That should  surprise no one. 130 131
Journal-style peer review is designed to keep scientific judgments within very broad professional
boundaries.  The threat of judicial review and professional norms together already provide
sufficient incentives to keep agencies within those broad boundaries; journal-style peer review
adds very little to the equation.  Dan can add a fn on NRC report on peer review of Corps
decisions 
Appropriate outside review which generates a publicly-available report can, however,
make scientific, political, and even management judgments more transparent.  Journal-style
review is not the best model for this purpose.  Review by a committee with the ability to interact
It is difficult to prescribe blanket rules for the appropriate use of intensive committee-132
style peer review.  Perhaps the current practice of seeking NRC review when a decision is
sufficiently controversial to need the added credibility that review can provide is as good a
method as any other.  J.B. Ruhl has tried to explore in more detail and on a more general level
the question of when the benefits of any kind of peer review of ESA regulatory decisions will
outweigh its costs.  J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered
Species Act, 83 NEBRASKA L. REV. __ (2005).  He suggests peer review of decisions with very
high economic costs (exceeding $100,000,000) and some random sample of other decisions.  We
would add that high-intensity peer review is appropriate only if the decision is characterized by a
high level of uncertainty.
See NRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 381-84 (brief biographies of the committee133
members).
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with the decisionmakers and other interested persons will be more effective.  Committee, rather
than individual, review allows representation of diverse disciplines, and discussion among
reviewers from various perspectives.  A multi-disciplinary committee is far more likely than
individuals experts in a single field to uncover and question the policy and management
judgments agencies have used to define the problem, and to offer for public consideration
alternative definitions of the problem with accompanying alternative solutions.  A review
committee will be most effective at increasing transparency if it has both the opportunity to
question decisionmakers (rather than having to rely on the written record alone), and the
authority to compel responses.  Of course, committee review is a resource-intensive step; it
should be used only where the levels of controversy and of uncertainty justify it.132
The NRC’s Klamath committee illustrates the benefits of a committee approach to
review.  Had the biological opinions been sent out by the agency for peer review, they would
almost certainly have been sent to two or three experts in fish biology and conservation, or
population viability.  The NRC committee included not only experts in these areas, but also a
limnologist, a resource economist, a forest biologist, a consulting engineer, a geomorphologist, a
law professor, and others.   That make-up both qualified the committee to take a broad look at133
the system and virtually guaranteed that it would do so.  Dan will provided a sentence about
the Glen Canyon NRC committee as an example of give and take  The committee’s final
Id. at 345-50.134
See CALFED Bay-Delta Authority, ISB,135
http://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/sci_tools/isb.shtml (describing CALFED’s Independent
Science Board, a standing multi-disciplinary review body) (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
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report documented a variety of actions, both past and present, within the Klamath watershed that
have contributed to the decline of the listed species, and a similar range of steps that might help
move those species toward recovery.  It is highly unlikely that individual peer reviewers, no
matter how dedicated, would have brought such a broad view of the problem to their task.
Effective outside reviews can also spur learning, by inspiring new thinking, demanding
accountability, and highlighting gaps in the existing data base that could be filled.  That seems to
be one positive outcome of the Klamath NRC review.  The committee’s final report included a
detailed set of recommendations for research and monitoring.   The report triggered, for the first134
time, meetings focusing on the science of the upper and lower basin (unfortunately so far only
separately).  It remains to be seen whether sufficient resources will be devoted to these efforts,
and what new information they will produce, but at the very least the NRC Klamath report raised
the awareness of everyone studying the ecology of the basin of unanswered, important questions.
Review committees can either be ad hoc, as is typical of those regularly convened by the
National Research Council, or long-term, like the review committees used by the CALFED Bay-
Delta Authority.   Where regulatory decisions are taken repeatedly over a period of years, a135
standing committee can better ensure that the agency does not fall into the same mistakes year
after year.  A standing committee, with the benefit of repeated meetings, may also have the
opportunity to become better educated itself about the system over time, and to refine its
interpersonal operations.  On the other hand, it may be difficult to get experts to make the multi-
year commitment necessary for a standing committee.  Over time, members of a standing
committee also may become undesirably close to the regulators whose actions they are supposed
to be overseeing, or to their appointing body.
While they can be very useful in highlighting the judgments made by regulators, if not
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carefully performed and presented outside reviews can themselves serve to hide the policy
 judgments of the reviewers.  Review committees should not simply be invited to critique
an agency decision.  They should be asked instead to:  evaluate the degree of scientific support
for a particular decision; identify gaps or weaknesses in the available data; highlight what
interpretive judgments were made and how the agency dealt with uncertainty; if possible,
quantify at least roughly the likelihood of errors of over- and under-regulation; and consider
whether and at what cost data gaps could be filled, and what value additional data would carry
for the regulatory decision.  Explicitly charging the review committee with revealing policy
judgments made in course of the regulatory process should discourage the committee from
simply substituting its own policy views for those of the regulatory agency under the guise of
scientific review.  It can also help avoid mischaracterization and misunderstanding of the review. 
The worst aspect of the Klamath NRC review was the way the committee’s interim report was
portrayed as showing that the regulatory agencies had engaged in “junk science.”  Had the
committee been from the outset more conscious of explicitly separating its review of the
scientific support for the regulatory decisions from review of the decision itself, and of
highlighting the non-scientific aspects of the decision, its interim report might have been less
vulnerable to such misuse.
It is also important that outside review not turn into a fly-specking exercise.  No decision
is perfect, especially when made in the face of sharply limited information.  Outside reviews by
“hired guns” often turn into exercises in identifying every small criticism to which the decision
might be subject, even if those flaws had no discernible impact on the decision.  Regulatory
decisions, because of the notice and comment procedure prescribed by the APA, are always
subject to that kind of review if there is an interested party with the resources to finance it.  When
submitted as mere comments on a rulemaking, those criticisms do not carry the authority of an
independent scientific review.  When a committee review is carried out, however, interested
parties can bury the committee with those sorts of criticisms, hoping to get the committee to sign
Professor Doremus experienced this kind of trivial data overload as a member of an136
NRC committee reviewing ESA decisions in the Platte River basin.  A consulting firm hired by
water users sought to overwhelm the committee with detailed, but ultimately not important,
criticisms of the regulatory agency’s conclusions about the Platte’s channel dynamics.
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on.   The review will be most useful if committee members are both capable of viewing the136
decision at a broad level, and inclined to do so.  The committee charge can help to insure that
attitude, but it is also important that committee members be selected not only for their
independence and specific expertise but also to some extent for their ability to see the larger
picture.  We believe the NRC selection process seeks that quality, although like anything else it is
not infallible.
Finally, outside reviews may by their very nature carry more credibility than they deserve. 
Outside reviewers may be expert in fields implicated by a regulatory decision, but they will
frequently be relative newcomers to the details of the particular system, with limited time and
resources to devote to getting up to speed.  They can provide a valuable additional perspective,
but they will not be infallible, and they might easily miss or misunderstand important details. 
Just as the authors of journal articles have the opportunity to respond to negative reviews,
regulatory agencies should have the opportunity to respond to external reviews.  Reviews of
regulatory decisions should move the conservation forward, not be expected to end it.
3.  Strengthening the institutional role of science
We also believe that agencies can be structured more self-consciously to strengthen the
institutional role of science, not merely that of conservation-minded scientists.  The CALFED
Bay-Delta program is a deliberate effort to do just that.  The key elements are a science program
independent of any regulatory function, led by a strong director with impeccable scientific
credential, and standing advisory panels of outside experts who regularly interact both with the
science program and with the agency’s regulatory arms.  Strong, credible agency science assisted
by committed outside reviewers can increase the accuracy and transparency of agency regulatory
decisions, and can have the added bonus of promoting effective and efficient learning, which
See Review of the 2003-04 Environmental Water Account (EWA), Submitted by the137
2004 EWA Review Panel 15-17 (1/17/05), available at
http://science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/ewa/EWA_technical_review_final_011705.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005).  Professor Doremus served on the CALFED EWA review panel for three years,
until she concluded that the committee’s limited impact on agency attitudes and actions did not
justify the time and effort its members were expending.
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over time will more closely constrain scientific judgments.
The CALFED experience also shows the difficulty of making that structure effective over
the long run.  Substantial resources must be devoted to the scientific enterprise; just as CALFED
has struggled overall to maintain funding at a credible level, the Science Program has struggled
to capture the resources promised in the original Record of Decision.  The political benefits of
spending on research will often be less attractive than spending on “pork-barrel” restoration
projects whose effectiveness is never subjected to close scrutiny.  Furthermore, outside review by
CALFED’s standing panels is hard work.  The most recent report by the Environmental Water
Account panel reveals the frustrations of the reviewers with their inability to control the review
agenda, which has left much of their time at the mercy of agency presentations that can be more
self-serving than informative.   In order to be most effective, outside review panels should137
themselves control the agenda of presentations (as NRC panels do), should be involved in the
assembly of review materials prior to their meetings, and should be supported by an agency
supervisor with the authority to demand that their recommendations be followed.
V.  CONCLUSION
Science is a necessary element of natural resource management decisions, but it is rarely
decisive.  The available scientific information is hardly ever sufficient to objectively determine
those decisions.  Substantial doses of judgment are needed to interpret incomplete information,
identify elements of the regulated system most likely to respond to management intervention, and
clarify the goals of regulation.  Those judgments simply cannot be removed from the equation,
and in most cases they, rather than the underlying data, are determinative.  Rather than
See generally John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Bush (II) Administration:138
An Outsider’s Somewhat Jaundiced Assessment, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347, 352-54
(2004).
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demanding perfectly rational regulatory decisions, those seeking reform of regulation (from
either side of the political spectrum) would be better served by a closer examination of the
judgments that go into regulatory decisions.
Those critical judgments are only very loosely constrained, allowing the regulatory
agencies substantial discretion to exercise their biases and policy preferences.  The extent of the
range of judgments allowed by existing legislation and regulation is strikingly illustrated by the
ability of the Bush administration to halt and reverse many Clinton administration conservation
efforts.   Courts and the conventional political process have not been very effective in138
overseeing these regulatory judgments, in large part because the technical nature of the decisions
allows many of them to be hidden.  Unrealistic demands for perfect scientific, objective
decisionmaking will only exacerbate this problem by driving judgments further underground.
Congress could act to more closely constrain agency regulatory judgments, but is not
likely to do so.  We suggest that any steps that either make the variety of judgments that go into
these decisions more transparent or encourage focused acquisition of relevant data will help put
sideboards on agency judgments, making it more likely that society’s substantive conservation
goals will be met.  Courts could help force regulatory judgments into the open through conscious
application of existing hard-look review.  Peer review by independent experts, appropriately
conducted, can both expose regulatory judgments and encourage learning.  Institutional structures
that encourage agencies to focus on what they do and do not know about the systems they
regulate can also have a role.
Because judgments will always be an important part of natural resource management, we
believe the institutions responsible for management and regulation should be consciously
designed and evaluated with an eye to the effect of agency structure on those judgments.  It
clearly matters how decisionmaking authority is divided between agencies with conservation
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missions and those with extractive or development missions.  It matters whether and how the
extent of uncertainty in the information supporting regulation is made apparent to the political
communicy.  It matters whether regulatory decisions are subject to outside review, by whom, and
how that review is structured.  All of these institutional factors, and others, matter not because
they will facilitate or impeded perfect scientific decisionmaking, but because they will inevitably
affect the way judgments are made.  They debate over natural resource management and
regulation needs to be expanded beyond the futile search for perfect rationality to encompass a
more realistic discussion of how to make the best possible decisions in an inevitably imperfect
world.
